COURT’S ADJOURNED

I am sick to fucking death of the recurring panic in public debate whenever the word “Sharia” appears. I should know better than to be triggered by ignorance, but I still am, every time. It is treated as if it represents a foreign legal system waiting to replace national law, or as if it introduces something fundamentally different from what already operates in Western democracies. The reality is far less dramatic. When people look at how religious legal processes actually function in countries like the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, the similarities between Islamic Sharia councils and Jewish Batei Din become obvious. But nobody jumps up and down about Batei Din; not many even know they’re a thing. Both exist within secular legal systems, operate voluntarily, and ultimately sit beneath the authority of national law.

There are also comparable arrangements within Christianity, including Christian Arbitration or Ecclesiastical Dispute Resolution and the Institute for Christian Conciliation, although they tend to attract far less attention because they have been part of Western societies for a long time and are therefore seen as normal rather than controversial, and they are so complex, as is everything over there, that no amount of crayons could do an explanation justice.

Sharia literally means "the path" or "way" (especially a path to water) in Arabic, while Beit Din (or Beth Din) literally means "house of judgment" in Hebrew.

The first point often lost in public arguments is that neither Sharia councils nor Batei Din; function as parallel legal systems. In the UK, for example, Sharia councils have no legal standing as courts and their decisions are not legally binding. They operate as advisory or mediating bodies, usually dealing with religious divorce, family matters or ethical guidance for believers. British law always takes precedence where there is conflict. The same is true of Jewish religious courts. A Beth Din is not recognised as a state court, and its rulings only have effect where individuals voluntarily agree to arbitration under existing civil law frameworks.

This is not a special concession to Muslims. It is part of a long-standing legal tradition in liberal democracies. Western legal systems routinely allow private arbitration. Businesses do it. Trade bodies do it. Religious communities do it. The key principle is consent. If two parties agree to resolve a dispute through arbitration, the state may enforce the outcome as it would any private arbitration agreement, provided it does not conflict with public law or human rights protections.

That framework applies equally to Jewish and Islamic processes. In Britain, scholars and legal commentators have noted that Sharia councils function in ways already familiar through the long-established Beth Din system, especially in areas such as contract disputes or religious divorce. The difference in public perception has more to do with politics and media framing than with legal reality.

Australia provides another example. Australian courts have dealt with disputes from Beth Din proceedings, but always on the basis that participation is voluntary and secular law governs enforcement. In one Federal Court case, a Beth Din decision was treated simply as an arbitration outcome under Australian law, not as an independent legal authority. The same principle applies to Islamic mediation or arbitration: religious processes may exist, but the courts decide what is enforceable.

The United States operates in a similar way. Religious arbitration is protected as an extension of freedom of religion and contract, but only within the limits of civil law. Courts may recognise arbitration agreements reached through religious bodies, whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim, but will refuse enforcement where outcomes breach public policy or statutory rights. The state remains supreme.

When critics complain about Sharia, they often describe a scenario that does not exist in these countries. They imagine criminal punishments, parallel policing, or religious authorities overriding national courts. None of this is legally possible in the UK, the US or Australia. Criminal law, family law, property law and human rights protections remain entirely within the jurisdiction of the state. Religious bodies cannot imprison anyone, seize property, or impose legally binding penalties outside the context of voluntary agreements.

In fact, the comparison with the Beth Din exposes how selective much of the outrage is. Jewish religious courts have operated in Western countries for well over a century without generating the same level of moral panic. They supervise religious divorces, mediate disputes and sometimes arbitrate civil disagreements within communities. Their existence has generally been accepted as part of multicultural religious life. The legal structure that allows them to operate is the same one that allows Muslim communities to seek religious guidance or mediation.

None of this means religious arbitration is beyond criticism. There are legitimate concerns about power imbalances, gender equality, and community pressure in any religious setting. Those concerns have been raised regarding both Sharia councils and batei din, and should be addressed through existing legal safeguards rather than through moral panic. The important point is that these concerns are not unique to Islam, nor are they evidence of an emerging parallel legal system.

Jewish religious courts have been present long enough to become invisible to most people, while Islamic institutions are newer and therefore easier to portray as threatening. Yet structurally they operate in much the same way: voluntary, limited in scope, and subordinate to national law.

The broader issue here is how secular democracies manage religious diversity. Modern societies contain people who organise parts of their lives around religious principles. Allowing voluntary mediation or arbitration based on those principles does not undermine the rule of law; it reflects the rule of law's flexibility. The state sets the boundaries. Within those boundaries, individuals are free to organise their personal and community affairs as they choose.

The claim that Sharia represents a unique danger collapses when placed alongside existing religious legal practices. What exists in reality is not a takeover, but a familiar form of private dispute resolution that has long existed across different faiths. The law of the land remains the law of the land, and in every Western democracy mentioned here, that principle has never been in doubt.

I’ll end, as I usually do, by blaming the vile, racist, bigoted rhetoric from politicians and the media. It’s always those two groups that fan the flames.  

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